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This study estimates the influence  of concentration and other structural variables on
the price of slaughter cattle.  Cross-sectional  data were used to estimate a single equation
model  which  included,  in  addition  to  traditional  factor  demand  variables,  packer
concentration  and a  measure  of market  power exerted  by feedlots.  Results  suggest that
packer  concentration  has had  a significant  and increasing  negative  impact  on  fed cattle
prices during  the years  of analysis,  1972  and 1977.
There  has been  continuing  interest in  the
effects  upon traditional  agriculture  and upon
consumers  of the  structural  changes  which
are  taking  place  in  the  agribusiness  sector,
including growing  concentration,  vertical  in-
tegration  and  conglomerate  merger.  John
Connor  describes  the  general  nature  of the
perceived  problem  in  a recent  USDA  com-
pendium  on  Structure Issues  of American
Agriculture,  p.  227.  He  says:  "Economic
theory  suggests  that  an  atomistically  or-
ganized  sector  wedged  between  two
oligopolistic  ones  will  pay  monopolistically
inflated  prices for  its input and receive  rela-
tively  lower,  less  flexible  prices  for  its  out-
put."  He  goes  on  to  state:  "When  there  is  a
high  level  of buyer concentration  in  a given
local  market  for  agricultural  produce,  price-
fixing,  price  leadership,  price  discrimination
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and other forms of collusive pricing are likely
to occur."
Although theory gives some clues as to the
expected  results,  relatively  few  empirical
studies have dealt directly with the effects  of
structural  variables  on  the  prices  of agricul-
tural commodities.  Lack of data,  rather than
lack  of  interest,  is  probably  the  principal
reason  for  this  omission.  Nevertheless,  re-
cent  congressional  interest  in  the  competi-
tive  environment  in  the  marketing  of beef
provides an impetus to quantify the effects  of
these structural  variables  on price  at various
levels of the beef industry.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the
influence  of concentration  and  other  struc-
tural variables  on  the  price  of slaughter  cat-
tle.  This  study  differs  from  most  previous
analyses of the influence  of concentration  on
economic outcomes  [Marion, et. al. and Hall,
et.  al.]  in  that  price  rather  than  profits  or
margins  is  taken  as  the  dependent variable,
and that the primary focus  is on the effects  of
buyer concentration  (oligopsony) rather  than
seller concentration  (oligopoly).  The hypoth-
esis  is  that  price  will  be  a  more  sensitive
measure  of the  effects  of concentration  than
profits  or  margins.  Profits  are  affected  by
price  behavior  of firms  in  their buying  and
selling  activities.  The  objective  here  is  to
specifically  identify  effects  of  concentration
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on  price  as  related  to buying  behavior.  En-
gelman  [1975,  p.  28]  suggests  that  market
concentration  on the buying side of the live-
stock business at the state and regional levels
is  greater  than many  realize.  Specific  objec-
tives  include:  a)  specifying,  estimating  and
evaluating  price  (fed  cattle)  endogenous
models which include measures of concentra-
tion  and other  economic  and  structural  pa-
rameters  at the packer level; and b) assessing
the  effects  of  packer  concentration  on  fed
cattle prices.
The Problem  Setting
The  beef industry  has  undergone  signifi-
cant  structural  change  in  the  last  decade.
Changes  in  the cattle feeding and  slaughter-
ing industries have included trends toward a)
fewer,  larger  firms;  and  b)  increased  geo-
graphic and firm concentration  [Ward,  1977].
In the four  largest cattle feeding states  (Tex-
as,  Nebraska,  Kansas  and  Iowa)  the  propor-
tion of total purchases  accounted  for  by the
four  largest  packers  in  the  state  averaged  a
little more than  50 percent in 1969.  By 1979,
this  proportion  had  increased  to  about  65
percent  [Engelman,  1980,  p.  22].
Writers  differ  on the  degree of concentra-
tion  necessary  to  produce  substantial
oligopoly (oligopsony)  effects.  Scherer [p.  60]
categorizes  a  market  as  an  oligopoly  if the
largest  four  firms  account  for  40  percent  of
the total market.  Bain  [p.  139]  suggests  that
when  the largest  four firms  have 65  percent
of  the  total  market,  the  market  is  a  highly
concentrated  oligopoly.  Concentration  ratios
(percent  of total  steer  and  heifer  slaughter)
for the four largest  slaughtering  firms in the
23  leading  cattle  feeding states indicate  that
beef packing  industries  in  22 of the 23 states
have  oligopolistic structures,  using  the stan-
dard of 40 percent or above.  Using the more
rigorous  standard  of  65  percent  or  above,
beef packing industries  in  17 of the 23 states
have  highly  concentrated  oligopolistic  struc-
tures [Ward,  1980].  Since procurement areas
are  usually  smaller than  a  single  state,  con-
centration  at the packer  level may in  fact be
greater  than  indicated  by  the  above  state
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concentration data [Engelman,  1980,  pp.  19-
23].  Thus,  the  markets  for  slaughter  cattle
may not be fully competitive and larger firms
may be able  to  control prices.
Concurrent with, and perhaps as a result of
increased concentration  in  the  beef packing
industry  there  has  been  an  increase  in  con-
centration  in  the  feedlot  sector.  Associated
with  the  increased  concentration  among
feedlots and packers  is  a change  in procure-
ment methods in the form of increased direct
purchases  by packers [Gee,  et. al. p.  24 and
Ward,  1977,  pp.  25-30].  The  trend  toward
increased  direct  purchases  may  also  be  at-
tributed  to the  decentralization  of the  live-
stock  industry.  While  most  cattle  are  pro-
duced  and  marketed  through  independent
firms,  there  are  some  notable  exceptions.
These  exceptions  include  vertically  integra-
ted arrangements between  packers and feed-
lots  and  ownership  of  national  packers  by
industrial  conglomerates.  These  arrange-
ments  may  result  in administered  prices  or
other pricing  practices  inconsistent  with  the
competitive  model.
The Economic  Model
Single  equation  models  were  specified  to
determine  the  impact  of packer  concentra-
tion on  fed  cattle  prices  for  two  years,  1972
and  1977.  Since  the  effects  of concentration
tend  to  be  more  pronounced  at  a  state  or
regional  level,  equations  were specified  on a
state rather  than  a  national basis.  In accord-
ance with factor demand theory,  the price of
the intermediate product (fed cattle) is  made
a  function  of  relative  plant  capacity,  input
prices  and  output  prices  in  a cross-sectional
analysis.1  To  measure  the  extent  of  the
oligopsony  effect,  a  measure  of packer  con-
centration  in  each  state  is  included  as  an
explanatory  variable.  Further,  a  variable  to
represent  the extent of bargaining power  ex-
'It  was  felt  that  the  underlying  economic  structure
would be more accurately  depicted by means of a cross-
sectional analysis rather than an analysis of a time series
of cross sections,  particularly when the primary focus  is
to isolate  the  effects  of concentration.
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erted by feedlots  is included.  The latter two
variables  are  included  in the model  to  mea-
sure  the  significance  and  magnitude  of  the
effects  of market  structure  on price.  Packer
concentration  is  a  measure  of  oligopsony
power,  while the measure of bargaining  pow-
er exerted  by feedlots  is  an attempt  to  iden-
tify the effects of oligopoly power.  Specifical-
ly,  the price of fed cattle was hypothesized to
be  a  function  of  the  capacity  of  slaughter
plants  in  the state relative  to  fed marketings
(surplus-deficit  measure),  price  of labor  in
the meatpacking  industry,  price  of wholesale
beef,  average  size of feedlot,  and  a measure
of packer concentration  at the  state level.
The  average  size  of  feedlot  variable  is  a
proxy  for  feedlot  concentration,  which  was
not readily available  for the years of analysis.
This variable is measured by total marketings
from  feedlots  with  capacities  of  1000  head
and over divided by the corresponding  num-
ber of feedlots.  Such a measure is intended to
reflect the dominance  of large firms  within a
state and  their influence  on the  price  of fed
cattle.  It  is  assumed  that  lots  of  1000  head
capacity and smaller are too small to exert an
oligopolistic  effect on price.  The price  of by-
products,  which  was judged  to be an impor-
tant explanatory  variable for fed cattle price,
could not be used  in the cross-sectional  anal-
ysis because  these data are not available on a
state  basis.
The  Statistical  Model
The  statistical  model  for  the  above  eco-
nomic model  follows:
PSCit  =  Bo  +  B1 SCSDit  +  B2 PLPit  +  B3
PWBit  +  B4  ASFit  +  B5 PCit  +  eit
Where:
PSCit  = deflated  average price  of choice
slaughter  (fed)  steers  900-1100
pounds  at  specific  state  mar-
kets2 - $/cwt.  [LS-214  and
Livestock and Meat Statistics];
SCSDit  =  slaughter cattle surplus and def-
icit by state as measured by the
annual  quantity  of  steer  and
heifer slaughter  by packers  in a
specific  state relative  to the an-
nual fed cattle marketings in the
state - percent [Committee  on
Small Business];
PLPit  =  deflated  annual  average  wage
rate  of  production  workers  in
meat-packing  plants  in  specific
states  - $/hour  [Census  of
Manufacturers];
PWBit  =  deflated annual average  price of
choice  steer  beef  600-700
pounds  carlot  basis  at  selected
regional  markets3 - $/cwt
[Livestock and Meat Statistics];
ASFit  =  average  size  of  feedlot  as  cal-
culated  by  total  marketings
from  feedlots with  capacities  of
1000 head  and over  divided by
the  corresponding  number  of
feedlots  - 1000  head  [Live-
stock and Meat Statistics];
PCit  =  concentration  of  meat-packing
plants in  selected states  as mea-
sured  by  the  percent  of  total
cattle  slaughtered  by  the  top
four  meat-packing  plants  in  the
state - percent [Committee  on
Small Business];
2Specific  state  markets  include:  Phoenix,  Arizona;  El
Centro,  California;  Portland,  Oregon;  Moses  Lake,
Washington;  Sioux  Falls,  South  Dakota;  Sioux  City,
Iowa;  Omaha,  Nebraska;  South  St.  Paul,  Minnesota;
Kansas  City,  Missouri;  Colorado  Feedlot  Sales,  Col-
orado;  Dodge  City,  Kansas;  Amarillo,  Texas;  Spring-
field,  Illinois;  Billings,  Montana;  Indianapolis,  Indiana;
Columbus,  Ohio;  Michigan  Auctions,  Michigan;  Salt
Lake City,  Utah.  The use of these  markets in  the data
series  varied  between  1972  and  1977,  as  explained
later.
3Due to  the limited  reporting of wholesale  beef prices,
states  were  aggregated  as  follows:  Arizona,  California,
Oregon  and Washington-  Los Angeles market;  South
Dakota,  Iowa,  Nebraska,  Minnesota,  Missouri,  Illinois,
Ohio  and  Michigan-  Midwest  market;  Colorado  -
Colorado  market;  and Texas  -Amarillo  market.  For
1972,  the  Chicago  market  was  used  for  Minnesota,
Illinois,  Indiana and Michigan.
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eit  - random  disturbance;
B's  =  structural  parameters;
i  =  states4
t  =  years  1972 and  1977.
In order to facilitate comparisons  of the mag-
nitudes of the coefficients between  1972 and
1977,  price  data  were  deflated  using  the
Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  Consumer  Price
index for all items,  1967 = 100.
Data and  Statistical  Considerations
Before  interpreting  the results  of the  sta-
tistical analysis,  data limitations  must be dis-
cussed.  Even  though an  effort  was  made  to
conduct  the analysis  at a  local  level in order
to more adequately measure  the influences of
oligopsony power, both the size and number
of areas  to be studied were  dictated to  some
extent by the availability  of data.  It could be
argued  that the true effects  of concentration
cannot  be  measured  even  at  the  state  level
because prices  may reflect conditions in  pro-
curement  areas  which do  not  correspond  to
state  boundaries.  Thus,  the  effects  of  the
structural  variables  may be obscured  by too
much  or too  little aggregation  of the  data or
by the failure  of market or procurement areas
to conform  to  state boundaries.
One  data  constraint  was  imposed  by  the
availability of wage rates in the meat-packing
industry.  Reasonably  complete  state  series
are  available  for  the  variable  in  the  census
years  (1972  and  1977).  Even  during  these
years,  wage  data  are  not  reported  for  all
states  because  of the  disclosure policy  of the
Department of Commerce.  The prices  of fed
cattle  were  not  available  for  all  states  from
the  LS-214,  perhaps  because  of the  lack  of
organized  fed  cattle  markets  in  some  states.
When  the  above  problems  are  combined,
degrees  of freedom  in the  statistical analysis
may  be  a  factor  to  consider.  Further,  as
4States for 1972 included:  California,  Arizona,  Montana,
Iowa,  Nebraska,  Minnesota,  Missouri,  Colorado,  Tex-
as,  Illinois,  Indiana  and  Michigan.  States  for  1977 in-
cluded:  California,  Arizona,  Oregon,  Washington,
South  Dakota,  Iowa,  Nebraska,  Minnesota,  Missouri,
Colorado,  Kansas,  Texas,  Illinois,  Ohio and  Michigan.
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noted  in  footnote  4,  the  states  used  in the
analysis were different in the two years of the
study,  limiting  somewhat  the  comparability
of the results  between  1972  and  1977.5
There  may be some problems  inherent  in
using the price  of carcass beef (PWB)  as the
product price in the fed cattle equation,  both
because  of the  extent  to  which  it  is  formula
priced,  and  the  increasing  importance  of
boxed  beef.  Formula  pricing  has  been
criticized  both  because  of alleged  shortcom-
ings  in  the  private  price  reports  (Yellow
Sheet) on which it is based, and the rigidities
introduced by the formula itself (differentials
for freight,  quality,  trim,  etc.)  [NCFM,  pp.
57-58].  Carcass beef now accounts for only 50
percent  of total  sales  while  boxed  beef ac-
counts for 40 percent or more and  is increas-
ing.  Approximately  70 percent of the sales  of
carcass beef are formula priced,  compared to
10-20 percent of boxed beef.  Some comfort is
taken  in  the fact  that formula  prices  are  not
much used in  Pacific markets  because  retail-
ers there  believe  that  the  midwest  "Yellow
Sheet"  prices are  not representative  of their
market  conditions.  The  percentage  of use  is
much higher in the eastern two-thirds  of the
U.S.  than  in  the west.  Also,  formula  prices
are  not  much  used  by  the  largest  retailers,
who rely on either direct negotiations  or offer
and acceptance  pricing  procedures  [Hayen-
ga,  1978,  1979].
From  a  practical  standpoint,  the  prices
used  were  the  only  ones  available  for  the
included  states.  Since  carcass beef prices  are
quoted for only five  regional markets  nation-
wide,  these  data  are  duplicated  for  several
states.  While  this  variable  may  effectively
sort  out  a  regional  market,  e.g.,  the  west
coast market, it has limited powers to explain
state-to-state  variation in the dependent  vari-
able.
5Another  analysis was conducted  in which ten identical
states were considered for 1972 and 1977. The results of
this analysis  were  consistent  with those  reported with
regard  to the market structure  variables  (ASF and  PC)
in  terms  of signs,  significance  and relative  magnitudes
of regression  coefficients.
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It would have been preferable  to use feed-
lot concentration  ratios rather than the aver-
age size  of feedlot variable.  However,  such a
measure  was  not  available  for  the  years  in-
cluded  in this  study.
Cross-sectional  data  were  deemed  more
appropriate  than  time  series  data,  given  the
variation  in  packer  concentration  across
states  as  compared  to  over  a  time  series.
Statistical  considerations  revolve  around  the
use of cross-sectional  data.  Heteroscedastici-
ty is the common statistical problem encoun-
tered  with  this  type  of  data  [Murphy  and
Kmenta].  Unfortunately,  in this analysis as in
most  analyses  conducted by  economists,  the
method  of  adjusting  for  heteroscedasticity
suggested by Murphy and Kmenta is  difficult
to  apply.  Data  are  not  replicated  and  thus
estimates  of  the  proportionality  constants
from the sample  data are  not obtainable.
One  source  of heteroscedasticity  is  auto-
correlation.  In  that  case,  not  only  may  the
variances  not  all  be  equal,  but  all  the
covariances will not be zero.  If it is  assumed,
as  it has  been  in  this  study,  that heterosce-
dasticity arises from autocorrelation,  the pro-
cedures  applicable  to  autocorrelation  prob-
lems should be utilized. The results reported
here  reflect  the  adjustment  for  autocorrela-
tion through the use of the Cochrane-Orcutt
iterative technique.
Results  and Implications
A priori expections concerning  the signs of
the variables included  in the above model are
suggested by factor demand theory, previous
research  and  knowledge  of the  industry.  In
the previously  specified  equation,  the price
of labor (PLP) is a priori inversely related to
the  price  of  fed  cattle.  The  surplus-deficit
(SCSD)  and  the  price  of  wholesale  beef
(PWB)  are  expected  to be  positively  related
to  fed  cattle  price.  The  sign  associated  with
the average size  of feedlot variable  is  expect-
ed  to  be  positive,  both  because  of the  in-
creased  bargaining  power  associated  with
size  and the  increased  technical  efficiencies
resulting from  the purchase  of larger groups
of cattle at one  location.
The sign associated with the coefficient for
the packer concentration  measure  is  normal-
ly expected  to be negative.  That is, if concen-
tration  increases,  there  would be a negative
effect  on  price.  However,  some  writers
speculate that the relation  may be positive in
the beef packing industry under certain con-
ditions,  in  some areas,  and during  specified
market  periods.  For  example,  Williams
[Committee  on  Small  Business,  p.  37]  indi-
cates that a direct relationship  might  exist if
the  larger firms  are  attempting  to  drive  out
competition by bidding up price for slaughter
cattle.  This  may be particularly  evident,  ac-
cording to Williams,  within selected procure-
ment  areas.  Williams,  however,  does  not
provide any empirical analysis to support this
hypothesis.
The results  reported in Table  1 should  be
interpreted  with  caution  because  the  states
included  in  the analysis of 1972 and  1977,  as
previously mentioned,  are different.  Relative
to expected  signs,  the results are mixed.  For
those variables which have coefficients signif-
icantly different from zero, relationships  with
the  dependent  variable  are  consistent  with
economic  reasoning,  with  the  exception  of
the price of labor in 1977.  Possibly this incon-
sistency  results  from  the  differences  in  the
states included  in the two years,  but the sign
in  1977 is  contrary  to economic  logic.
The  significance,  or  lack  thereof,  of  the
surplus-deficit  variable  seems  to  follow  the
cattle  cycle,  being  significant  in  1972  when
supplies were  tight  and there  was  real com-
petition  among  packers  for  cattle,  and  not
significant in 1977 when cattle numbers were
greater.  The  significance,  or lack  thereof, of
the  price  of wholesale  beef  is  explained  by
the  different  mix  of states  included  during
the two  years  of analysis.  Price of wholesale
beef is  a  variable  which  has  a  strong  geo-
graphical  orientation.  Beef and cattle  prices
are higher on the west coast and the inclusion
of more west  coast states  in  the second year
increases  the  regression  coefficient  and  the
level  of significance.  The change  in  the  sign
and significance of the average  size of feedlot
variable  is  quite interesting.  The number of
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TABLE 1. Estimated  Regression  Coefficients  and  Summary  Statistics Using  the  Cochrane-
Orcutt Iterative Technique,  1972 and  1977,  Real  Prices.
1972  1977
Regression  t  Regression  t
Variable/Year  Coefficients  Statistics  Coefficients  Statistics
Constant  25.3142  22.6918
SCSD  0.0089  2.6141  0.0002  0.0980
PLP  -0.2676  -1.4494  0.3100  2.2000
PWB  0.0960  0.9817  0.1260  2.6147
ASF  -0.0103  -0.7234  0.0582  3.9159
PC  - 0.0145  - 2.6077  - 0.0220  -3.8271
R 2 0.7886  0.7945
F Value  3.7297  6.1854
Rho  -0.7897  -0.6172
feedlots has decreased,  and consequently the
average  size  of feedlot  has  increased,  allow-
ing for perhaps  an increased bargaining posi-
tion.  Although  the  magnitudes  of  the  two
coefficients  are  not directly  comparable  and
the  net  effects  on  price  remain  indetermi-
nate,  there  is  a  possible  suggestion  in  the
second  period  of  a  countervailing  power
structure.  This  would  involve  a  bilateral
oligopoly  situation,  consisting  of  large  and
powerful  feedlots  bargaining  with  equally
large and  powerful  packers.
The  results  are  consistent  with  respect  to
the concentration  variable.  This  relationship
is negative  and significant  for each of the two
years.  A  comparison  of  the  coefficients  as-
sociated  with  packer  concentration  indicates
that there  has been  a substantial  increase  in
the  negative  impact  of this  variable  on  the
real price  of fed cattle between the years  on
the  analysis.  This  result  is  supported  by  a
supplementary  analysis  which  included  an
identical ten states  in  each  of the two  years.
(See footnote 5).  Such results suggest that the
concern over concentration  in the beef pack-
ing  industry  by  Congress  is  warranted  and
needs  further  investigation.  Furthermore,
the  hypothesized  positive  relationship  sug-
gested by Williams (previously discussed)  ap-
pears  to be incorrect.
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Concluding  Remarks
Large  scale  corporations  have  become  a
common feature of the agricultural input sec-
tor  and the food processing and  distribution
sectors.  Trends  in the last decade have been
toward  still  fewer  and  larger  firms,  often
accomplished  through  merger  and  acquisi-
tion,  and  toward  an  increase  in  integrated
arrangements.  There has been  growing  con-
cern  about  the  effects  of  these  structural
changes  upon  competitive  outcomes.  Such
concerns  are  validated  by  the results  of this
study.  More  attention  needs  to be  given  to
identifying  the effects  of the changing  struc-
ture in  agriculture.
There may be some tendency for the pres-
ence of large feedlots in an area to counteract
the oligopsony  effect  of large  packers.  How-
ever,  it  would  be  naive  to  expect  that  the
outcome  would  approach  the  competitive
ideal,  given  the prevailing  extent  of vertical
integration  and conglomerate  merger.  While
the importance  of these arrangements  is rec-
ognized,  the  magnitude  and  perhaps  even
the  direction  of their  effects  are  difficult  to
determine,  in  part because  internal  transac-
tions  are usually not  reported.
From  a  policy  perspective,  consideration
should be given to the question of what is the
acceptable  level  of concentration,  based  on
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chosen performance  criteria.  Furthermore,  if
regulatory  action  is  contemplated,  the  con-
trol variables  which  influence  the  structural
change process  must be accurately identified
in  order  for  such  programs  to be  effective.
This latter issue is addressed by Reimund,  et.
al.  for  broilers,  fed  cattle  and  processing
vegetables.
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